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Abstract
The saving patterns of retired U.S. households pose a challenge to the
basic life-cycle model of saving. The observed patterns of out-of-pocket
medical expenses, which rise quickly with age and income during retire-
ment, and heterogeneous lifespan risk, can explain a signicant portion
U.S. savings during retirement. However, more work is needed to disen-
tangle these precautionary saving motives from other motives, such as
the desire to leave bequests. An important complementary question is
why households do not buy more insurance against these risks. Going
beyond total savings and looking at its components, including hous-
ing, and looking at other portfolio choices can help shed light on these
questions.
2
1 Introduction
More than one-third of total wealth (Wol [98]) in the United States is held
by households whose heads are over age 65. This wealth is an important de-
terminant of their consumption and welfare. As the U.S. population continues
to age, the way in which its elderly manage their wealth will only grow in
importance. Most developed countries face similar circumstances.
Retired U.S. households, especially those with high income, decumulate
their assets at a rate slower than that implied by the basic life cycle model,
where the time of death is known. This raises the question of which additional
saving motives lie behind their behavior. The answers to this question are key
to understanding how their savings would respond to potential policy reforms.
In this paper, we present evidence on the potential reasons why so many
elderly households hold lots of assets into very old age. Most of these expla-
nations fall into two categories.
The rst set of explanations emphasizes the risks that the elderly face late in
life, particularly uncertain lifespans and uncertain medical spending. That is,
elderly households may be holding onto their assets to cover expensive medical
needs at extremely old ages. In fact, the observed patterns of out-of-pocket
medical expenses, which rise quickly with age and income during retirement,
coupled with heterogeneous lifespan risks, can explain a signicant portion of
U.S. savings during retirement. It should also be noted that, even if the elderly
save exclusively for these reasons, many of them will leave bequests because
they die earlier or face lower medical spending than planned.
The second set of explanations emphasizes bequest motives. Individuals
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may receive utility from leaving bequests to their survivors, most notably their
children.
These two sets of motivations have similar implications for savings in old
age, making it dicult to disentangle their relative importance. We discuss
promising research that attempts to resolve this problem by looking at ad-
ditional features of the data. We point out the importance of going beyond
total savings and looking at housing. We also discuss the roles of insurance,
portfolio choice, and rate of return risk.
Section 2 describes the patterns of savings, annuitized income, medical
spending, health and mortality, and bequests for retired elderly households in
the United States. Section 3 sketches out a life cycle model of single retirees
that can illustrate many of the potential saving motivations that face elderly
savers. Section 4 analyzes the savings implications of medical expenses and
dierential mortality within this model. In this section we also discuss possible
reasons why households don't buy nancial products that address these risks
directly, namely annuities and long-term care insurance. Section 5 discusses
bequest motives. Section 6 considers the role of housing, as opposed to nancial
assets, in determining retirees' saving. This section also includes a discussion
of portfolio choice and rate of return risk. Section 7 documents some facts on
couples and briey discusses some of the issues involved with modeling their
saving. Section 8 reports on the aggregate eects of saving motives and their
implications for various policy reforms. Section 9 concludes.
4
2 Facts for retired households
An important factor determining the elderly's welfare is their consumption,
which is nanced by savings, Social Security payments, private pensions, and
other transfers from government and family. Gustman and Steinmeier [44]
show that for households near retirement, wealth is equal to about one third
of lifetime income. Examining the same age group, Scholz et al. [92] document
the three key funding sources of retiree consumption: net worth, employer-
provided pensions, and Social Security benets. They nd that, with the
notable exception of people in the bottom lifetime income decile, who rely
only on Social Security, net worth is a major source of funds. Love et al. [70]
compute the trajectories of net worth and the discounted present value of
annuity income during retirement. They too nd that net worth is a signicant
component of total wealth.
We will keep net worth and annuitized income separate in our analysis. As
Hurd [51] emphasized, when households cannot borrow against future income
such as Social Security benets, the distribution of total wealth between net
worth and annuitized income will aect consumption and saving.
To describe the saving of the elderly, we use data from the Assets and
Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) data set. The AHEAD is a
survey of individuals who were non-institutionalized and aged 70 or older in
1994. It is part of the Health and Retirement Survey (HRS) conducted by the
University of Michigan. We use data on assets and other variables, starting in
1996 and updating every two years thereafter.
The graphs in this section, which are taken from De Nardi et al. [24], use
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data only for singles. Single retirees comprise about 50% of age 70+ people
and 70% of age 70+ households. In Section 7 we present some graphs for
couples.
We break the data into 5 cohorts. The rst cohort consists of individuals
who were ages 72-76 in 1996; the second cohort contains ages 77-81; the third
ages 82-86; the fourth ages 87-91. We construct life-cycle proles by computing
summary statistics by cohort and age at each year of observation. Moving from
the left-hand-side to the right-hand-side of our graphs, we thus show data for
four cohorts, with each cohort's data starting out at the cohort's average age
in 1996.
Since we want to understand the role of income, we further stratify the data
by post-retirement permanent income (PI). Hence, for each cohort our graphs
usually display several horizontal lines showing, for example, median assets
in each PI group in each calendar year. We measure post-retirement PI as
the individual's average non-asset, non-social means-tested insurance income
over all periods during which he or she is observed. Non-asset income includes
the value of Social Security benets, dened benet pension benets, veterans
benets and annuities. Because non-asset income is generally increasing in
lifetime earnings, it provides a good proxy for PI.
2.1 Asset proles
We calculate net worth (interchangeably called assets or savings in this paper)
using the value of housing and real estate, autos, liquid assets (which include
money market accounts, savings accounts, T-bills, etc.), IRAs, Keoghs, stocks,
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the value of a farm or business, mutual funds, bonds, \other" assets and in-
vestment trusts less mortgages and other debts. Juster et al. (1999) show
that the wealth distribution of the AHEAD matches up well with aggregate
values for all but the richest 1% of households. The amounts below are in 1998
dollars.
Figure 1: Median assets for singles.
Figure 1 displays display median assets, conditional on birth cohort and
permanent income quintile, for singles. It presents asset proles for the un-
balanced panel; each point represents the median for all the members of a
particular cell that are alive at a particular date. Median assets are increasing
in permanent income, with the 74-year-olds in the highest PI income of the
singles holding about $200,000 in median assets, while those at the lowest PI
quintiles holding essentially no assets. Over time, those with the highest PI
tend to hold onto signicant wealth well into their nineties, those with the
lower PIs never save much, while those in the middle PIs display some asset
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decumulation as they age. Thus, even at older ages, richer people save more,
a nding rst documented by Dynan et al. [28] for the whole life cycle.
2.2 Asset proles and mortality bias
Figure 2: Median assets by birth cohort: everyone in the data (solid lines) vs.
survivors (dashed lines).
It is well documented that health and wealth are positively correlated (see
for instance, Smith [94], Poterba et al. [88], and Adams et al. [1]). As a result,
poor people die more quickly and as a cohort ages its surviving members are
increasingly likely to be rich. Failing to account for this mortality bias will
lead a researcher to overstate asset accumulation. (Shorrocks [93], Mirer [77],
and Hurd [50]). Figure 2 compares asset proles that are aggregated over all
income quintiles. The solid line shows median assets for everyone observed at a
given point in time, even if they died in a subsequent wave, i.e., the unbalanced
panel. The dashed line shows median assets for the subsample of individuals
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who were still alive in the nal wave, i.e., the balanced panel. Figure 2 shows
that the asset proles for those who were alive in the nal wave have much
more of a downward slope. The dierence between the two sets of proles
conrms that people who died during our sample period tended to have lower
assets than the survivors.
The rst pair of lines in Figure 2 shows that failing to account for mortality
bias would lead us to understate the asset decumulation of those who were 74
years old in 1996 by over 50%. In 1996 median assets of the 74-year-olds
who survived to 2006 were $84,000. In contrast, in 1996 median assets for all
74-year-olds were $60,000. Median assets of those who survived to 2006 were
$44,000. The implied drops in median assets between 1996 and 2006 therefore
depend on which population we look at: only $16,000 for the unbalanced panel,
but $40,000 for the balanced panel of those who survived to 2006. This is
consistent with the ndings of Love et al. [70]. Sorting the data by permanent
income reduces, but does not eliminate, this mortality bias.
2.3 Income proles
We allow annuity income to be a exible function of PI, age, and other vari-
ables. Figure 3 presents average income proles, conditional on PI quintile and
thus shows how income evolves over time for the same sample of elderly people.
Average annual income ranges from about $5,000 per year in the bottom PI
quintile to about $23,000 in the top quintile; median wealth holdings for the
two groups are zero and just under $200,000, respectively.
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Figure 3: Average income, by permanent income quintile.
2.4 Medical spending proles
Although Kotliko [62] pointed out nearly 30 years ago that medical expense
risk could be an important driver of savings, it was not until the late 1990s that
top quality panel data on the medical spending of older households became
available in the AHEAD/HRS.1
As with income, out-of-pocket medical spending is a exible function of PI,
age, and other variables. Figure 4 presents average simulated medical expenses,
conditional on age and permanent income quintile. Permanent income has a
large eect on average medical expenses, especially at older ages. Average
medical expenses are less than $1,000 a year at age 75 and vary little with
income. By age 100, they rise to $2,900 for those in the bottom quintile of the
income distribution and to almost $38,000 for those at the top of the income
distribution. Mean medical expenses at age 100 are $17,700, which is greater
1Data from Medicare Current Beneciary Survey (MCBS) became available at about the
same time. De Nardi et al. [21] review the MCBS medical spending data in some detail.
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than average income of those of the same age.
Figure 4: Average out-of-pocket medical expenses, by permanent income quin-
tile.
An individual's out-of-pocket medical spending is a function not only of the
medical services she receives, but also of her resources and insurance coverage.
In fact, those with low assets on average pay a smaller share of their total
medical care costs because they receive more assistance from means tested
social insurance programs such as Medicaid. By way of example, consider two
people who need to be in a nursing home that costs $50,000. One person is
not Medicaid eligible. In most cases neither Medicare nor private insurance
will cover her costs and her out-of-pocket medical cost will be the full $50,000.
The second person has no income or assets and is thus eligible for Medicaid.
Her out-of-pocket cost will be zero.
If we look at the out-of-pocket medical expenses for the Medicaid-eligible
person, we would conclude that she faces no medical risk. However, to study
the eects of health insurance, public or private, one cannot describe the un-
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derlying medical expense risk without data on Medicaid payments. Figure 5,
taken from De Nardi et al. [21], uses Medicare Current Beneciary Survey
(MCBS) data to summarize total medical expenditure over the age-65+ com-
ponent of the life cycle. Figure 5 shows that Medicaid spending is signicant,
especially at older ages when nursing home expenses become larger. Ignor-
ing Medicaid spending would lead us to signicantly understate total medical
expenditure risk.
Government: Medicare
Government: Medicaid
Government: Other
Out−of−pocket &
Uncollected liability
Private Insurance
0
10000
20000
30000
40000
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 100
Age
Figure 5: Average total medical expenditure, by age and payor type.
2.5 Mortality and health status
We treat health as a binary variable (good or bad), which we derive from
respondents' self-assessments of their overall health status. As with income
and medical spending, we allow the probabilities of bad health and death to
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Income Healthy Unhealthy Healthy Unhealthy
Quintile Male Male Female Female Alla
bottom 7.6 5.9 12.8 10.9 11.1
second 8.4 6.6 13.8 12.0 12.4
third 9.3 7.4 14.7 13.2 13.1
fourth 10.5 8.4 15.7 14.2 14.4
top 11.3 9.3 16.7 15.1 14.7
By gender:b By health status:c
Men 9.7 Unhealthy 11.6
Women 14.3 Healthy 14.4
Notes: Life expectancies calculated through simulations using estimated health
transition and survivor functions; aCalculations use the gender and health
distributions observed in each permanent income quintile; bCalculations use
the health and permanent income distributions observed for each gender;
cCalculations use the gender and permanent income distributions observed
for each health status group.
Table 1: Life expectancy in years, conditional on reaching age 70.
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be exible functions of PI, age, previous health status and gender. Table 1
presents predicted life expectancies. Rich people, women, and healthy people
live much longer than their poor, male, and sick counterparts. Two extremes
illustrate this point: an unhealthy male at the bottom quintile of the perma-
nent income distribution expects to live only 6 more years, that is, to age 76.
In contrast, a healthy woman at the top quintile of the permanent income
distribution expects to live 17 more years, thus making it to age 87.2 Our
estimated income gradient is similar to that in Waldron [97], who nds that
those in the top of the income distribution live 3 years longer than those at
the bottom, conditional on being 65. Attanasio and Emerson [7] document
similar ndings for the for UK, while Hurd et al. [53] and Gan et al. [40] do so
for the US.
We also nd that for rich people, the probability of living to very old ages,
and thus facing very high medical expenses, is signicant. For example, we
nd that a healthy 70-year-old woman in the top quintile of the permanent
income distribution faces a 14% chance of living 25 years, to age 95.
2.6 Bequests
Gale and Scholz [39] show that intergenerational transfers are large in the
aggregate. However, while many people die with positive assets, leaving be-
quests to their heirs, most of these bequests are very modest. For example, De
2Our predicted life expectancy at age 70 is about three years less than the aggregate
statistics imply. This discrepancy stems from using data on singles only: when we re-
estimate the model for both couples and singles, predicted life expectancy is within a year
of the aggregate statistics for both men and women.
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Nardi et al. [24] show that one year before their death, 30% of people own less
than $10,000, 70% of people own less than $100,000, and 98% of people own
less than $1,000,000. Hurd and Smith [54] report that the average bequest
amounts left by decedents are even lower. French et al. [36] nd that part, but
not all of this decline can be explained by medical spending in the last year
of life and death expenses from burial fees. This decline might also be caused
by reporting errors, as children of decedents tends to underreport the value of
estates (Gale and Scholz [39], Laitner and Sonnega [66]), or by transfers aimed
at reducing estate taxes (Kopczuk [59]).
3 A life-cycle model
We can analyze many potential savings motives by studying a fairly simple
version of the life cycle saving model. In this model a single person faces lifes-
pan uncertainty, uncertain medical expenses, bequest motives, and a health-
dependent utility function. The person maximizes her expected utility by
choosing how much to save in a risk-free asset. Versions of this model have
been estimated in De Nardi et al. [23, 24] and have been found to t the data
well.
Consider a retired single person, seeking to maximize his expected lifetime
utility by choosing consumption ct; at age t, t = tr+1; :::; T , where tr is the
retirement age. Each period, utility depends on both consumption and health
status, h; which can be either good (h = 1) or bad (h = 0).
The ow utility from consumption is
u(c; h) = (h)
c1 
1   ; (1)
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with   0. The dependence of utility on health status is given by
(h) = 1 + h; (2)
so that when  = 0, health status does not aect utility.
As in De Nardi [20], the utility the household derives from leaving assets
to his or her heirs is
(a) = 
(a+ k)
1  
(1 )
; (3)
where  is the intensity of the bequest motive, while k determines the curvature
of the bequest function and hence the extent to which bequests are luxury
goods.
We assume that non-asset income, yt, is a deterministic function of sex, g,
permanent income, I, and age:
yt = y(g; I; t): (4)
The individual faces several sources of exogenous risk.
1. Health status uncertainty. The transition probabilities for health status
depend on previous health, sex, permanent income, and age,
j;k;g;I;t = Pr(ht+1 = kjht = j; g; I; t); j; k 2 f1; 0g: (5)
2. Survival uncertainty. Let sg;h;I;t denote the probability that an individual
of sex g is alive at age t + 1, conditional on being alive at age t, having
time-t health status h, and enjoying permanent income I.
3. Medical expense uncertainty. Medical expenses, mt, are dened as out-
of-pocket expenses. The mean and the variance of the log of medical
16
expenses depend upon sex, health status, permanent income, and age.
The stochastic, idiosyncratic component ofmt is modeled as the sum of a
persistent AR(1) process and a white noise process. French and Jones [37]
and Feenberg and Skinner [31] show that having both persistent and
transitory medical expense shocks is essential to replicating observed
medical expense dynamics.
Assets evolve according to
at+1 = at + yn(rat + yt; ) + bt  mt   ct; (6)
at  0: (7)
where yn(rat + yt; ) denotes post-tax income, r denotes the risk-free, pre-tax
rate of return, the vector  describes the tax structure, and bt denotes gov-
ernment transfers. Equation (7) imposes a borrowing constraint. Government
transfers ensure that this constraint can be met even when medical expenses
are large. The transfers bridge the gap between an individual's \total re-
sources" (i.e., assets plus income less medical expenses) and the consumption
oor c:
bt = maxf0; c+mt   [at + yn(rat + yt; )]g; (8)
If transfers are positive, ct = c and at+1 = 0.
3
The consumer's nancial resources are summarized by cash-on-hand, xt;
xt = at + yn(r at + yt; ) + bt  mt: (9)
3See De Nardi et al. [25] for a discussion of the Medicaid rules and Hubbard et al. [48]
for other means tested social insurance programs.
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Letting  denote the discount factor, we can write the dynamic problem re-
cursively
Vt(xt; g; ht; I; t) = max
ct;xt+1

u(ct; ht) + sg;h;I;tEtVt+1(xt+1; g; ht+1; I; t+1)
+ (1  sg;h;I;t)(at+1)

; (10)
subject to
at+1 = xt   ct; (11)
xt+1 = xt   ct + yn
 
r(xt   ct) + yt+1; 

+ bt+1  mt+1; (12)
xt  c; 8t; (13)
ct  xt; 8t: (14)
De Nardi at al. [22] estimate this model using the Method of Simulated Mo-
ments (as done by Gourinchas and Parker [42], Cagetti [15], and French [34])
and nd that the model matches the observed asset data very well. In the
following sections we show various simulations of the model (for a set of esti-
mated preference parameters that match the data well) when we shut down
dierent combinations of its features in order to show how retirement saving
responds to various saving motives.
4 Precautionary motives
We rst report results for the case with no bequest motive ( = 0) and no
health-dependent utility ( = 0).
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4.1 Exogenous medical spending
We ask whether the out-of-pocket medical expenditures estimated from the
data are an important driver of old age savings. To answer this question,
we zero out all out-of-pocket medical expenditures and examine the resulting
changes in assets. Figure 6, taken from De Nardi et al. [24], shows median
assets with and without medical expenses. We construct this gure by sim-
ulating the net worth of the AHEAD birth-year cohort whose members were
ages 72-76 (with an average age of 74) in 1995. We take the initial distribution
of net worth, permanent income, health status, medical expenses, and sex from
the 1995 AHEAD data. As the model reproduces the same mortality bias that
is present in the data, for ease of interpretation, we display proles with no
attrition, so that the composition of the simulated sample is xed over the
entire sample period. This allows us to track the saving of the same people
over time.
The dashed lines in Figure 6 display the net worth proles generated by
the baseline model with medical expenses. There are ve of those dashed
lines, representing asset proles for each PI quintile. As in the data, the
assets of those at the bottom quintile are not visible because they are close
to zero. Households in this PI group rely on their annuitized income and the
government consumption oor to nance their retirement. People with higher
PI levels start out with considerably more assets and decumulate their net-
worth very slowly, with those in the top PI quintile starting o at $170,000 in
median net worth at age 74 and retaining over $100,000 past age 90.
The solid lines in Figure 6 are the asset proles that result when medical
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expenses are eliminated. Comparing the dashed and solid lines reveals that
medical expenses are a big determinant of retiree saving. Medical expenses
are especially important for those with high permanent income, who face the
highest expenses and are relatively less insured by the government-provided
consumption oor. These retirees are reducing their current consumption in
order to pay for the high out-of-pocket medical expenses they expect to bear
later in life. If there were no out-of-pocket medical expenses, individuals in the
highest permanent-income quintile would deplete their net worth by age 94.
In the baseline model with medical expenses their asset holdings at age 100
are almost $40,000. The risk of living long and having high medical expenses
late in life signicantly increases savings. Our results indicate that modeling
uncertain lives and out-of-pocket medical expenses is important in evaluating
policy proposals that aect the elderly.
4.2 Endogenous medical spending and health-dependent
utility
The results shown in Figure 6 are constructed under the assumption that
medical spending is exogenous. This leaves no scope for individuals to cut back
on medical spending when in dire nancial straights. Several papers address
the issue of endogenous medical expenditure. De Nardi et al. [24], McMcClellan
and Skinner [75], and Ameriks et al. [4] allow increased medical expenditures
to increase current period utility, reecting channels such as improved nursing
care. Yogo [101], Khwaja [57], Davis [19], Halliday et al. [45], Fonseca et
al. [33], Hugonnier et al. [49], Scholz and Seshadri [91] and Ozkan [83] build
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Figure 6: Median assets by cohort and PI quintile: baseline model (dashed
lines) and model with no medical expenses (solid lines).
upon the Grossman [43] model of investment in health.
The results of De Nardi et al. [24] suggest, rst, that whether exogenous
or endogenous, medical expenses need to match the data and thus have a sim-
ilar impact on observed savings. If individuals expect to purchase expensive
medical services at the ends of of their lives, they will save to cover these
expenditures. Second, when evaluating the eects of counterfactual policy
experiments, such as adjusting the consumption oor c, allowing medical ex-
penses to adjust will mitigate the savings response. Yogo [101] also nds that
allowing for endogenous medical spending reduces the precautionary savings
motive.
Laitner et al. [65] show that the risk of facing high medical costs is in many
ways equivalent to the risk of an increase in the marginal utility of consump-
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tion. In both cases, desired spending increases and the risk of higher future
spending generates precautionary saving motives. They use this result to con-
struct a simpler version of our model that can be solved analytically. Models
of endogenous medical spending in many ways take a similar approach, as
medical spending shocks are shifts in the marginal utility of medical spending,
either direct as in De Nardi et al. [24], or changes in the returns to investment
in health and thus endogenize medical expenses for the purpose of building
and preserving health.
A related question is whether the marginal utility of non-medical consump-
tion varies with health, even after controlling for medical spending. In the
model at hand, the health-dependent utility parameter  is identied from
the observed evolution of health, the asset proles, and out-of-pocket medical
expenditures. If consumption is the residual in the budget constraint after
controlling for asset growth and medical expenses, health-dependent utility
is identied from the relationship between implied consumption and health.
Palumbo [84] and Low and Pistaferri [72] take similar approaches. In De Nardi
et al. [24], this parameter is negative|the marginal utility of consumption is
higher in bad health|but estimated very imprecisely. Hong et al. [47] use
consumption and health data and nd that bad health reduces the marginal
utility of consumption at younger ages and increases it at older ages. If the
marginal utility of health rises at older ages because of declining health, this
could create an additional motivation to hold onto assets at older ages. How-
ever, the literature has not yet reached a consensus about whether bad health
raises or reduces the marginal utility of consumption, let alone the eect's
magnitude (Finkelstein et al. [32]).
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4.3 Heterogenous mortality
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Simulated assets by age and PI
Figure 7: Median net worth under dierent mortality Assumptions
Notes : |-: baseline. {  {: everyone in bad health. { {: everyone male and
in bad health. {+|+{: everyone low permanent income, male, and in bad
health.
Figure 7, taken from De Nardi et al. [23], uses our model to show how
median assets vary with mortality. There are ve clusters of lines in Figure 7,
one for each PI quintile. (The asset holdings of the bottom PI quintile are again
not visible.) The top line in each cluster shows median assets associated with
the baseline mortality assumptions. For each PI level, we also plot the savings
generated by the model under three other cases, where we make increasingly
pessimistic assumptions about how long people expect to live. This allows us
to isolate the eect of the cross-sectional heterogeneity in mortality rates on
saving. First, as presented in the top dashed-dot line, everyone is assumed
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to always be in bad health and have the associated mortality of those in bad
health. The resulting drop in life expectancy is 2-4 years, depending on gender
and PI. This lower life expectancy generates a noticeable drop in net worth,
especially for the highest PI households. The next dashed line corresponds to
the mortality expectations of males who are always sick, who on average live
5 years less than a woman of the same health and PI. The bottom crossed line
corresponds to the mortality expectations of low income males who are always
sick. In summary, dierences in life expectancy related to health, gender, and
permanent income are important to understanding savings patterns across
these groups, and the eect of each factor is of a similar order of magnitude.
75 80 85 90 950
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
x 104
Age
A
ss
et
s
Figure 8: Median net worth under dierent mortality assumptions when there
are no medical expenses
Notes : |-: baseline. {+|+{: everyone low permanent income, male, and in
bad health.
Figure 8 shows the asset proles that arise when there is lifespan uncer-
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tainty but no medical costs. The solid line displays asset proles for the base-
line life expectancy case, while the crossed line refers to the case in which
everyone has the life expectancy of a sick, poor and male person. Comparing
Figure 8 to Figure 7 reveals that when there are no medical expenses the ef-
fects of changing life expectancy are much smaller in absolute terms, even if
they are larger in relative terms. In absence of medical expenses, giving the
richest people the mortality rates of a sick, low-income male reduces assets at
age 85 by $32,000. Figure 7 shows that with medical expenses the reduction is
$50,000. Medical expenses that increase with age and permanent income prop
up old age savings for the richest. When their life expectancy is decreased, rich
retirees are less likely to survive to very old age and face very large medical
expenses. This has a large eect on their level of savings and the sensitivity
of their savings to expected mortality.
In interpreting this nding, it is important to keep in mind that we do
not allow medical spending to jump immediately before death. De Nardi et
al. [21], Braun et al. [12], French et al. [36] and Marshall et al. [73] show that
expenses incurred near the time of death are large. The way in which medical
expenses increase with age therefore to some extent reects higher mortality,
a feature not captured in our spending model. However, in our baseline model
medical expenses and mortality both increase when health switches from good
to bad. Moreover, Spillman and Lubitz [95] and Braun et al. [12] show that
end-of-life costs rise with age, probably because of increased long-term care
costs.
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4.4 The role of lifespan risk
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Figure 9: Median Net Worth under Dierent Mortality Assumptions
Notes : {+|+{: everyone low permanent income, male, and in bad health. {
o{o{: everyone low permanent income, male, in bad health, and with a certain
lifespan.
In this section we consider the eects of longevity risk|the risk of outliving
one's expected lifespan|on saving, an issue rst considered by Davies [18].
Figure 9 shows two sets of simulations. As in Figure 7, the crossed line shows
predicted net worth when everyone faces the mortality rates of a man with low
permanent income who is in bad health. This man has an expected lifespan of
5 years, but faces the risk of living much longer. The circle-dash line eliminates
this risk; all individuals in these simulations expect to live exactly 5 years, to
age 79. In such a case, there is no value in holding assets after 5 years, hence
individuals deplete their net worth by the end of their fth year, consistent
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with a basic life cycle model. In contrast, most individuals facing uncertain
lifespans still have signicant asset holdings after 5 years, even when facing the
most pessimistic survival prospects. This comparison shows that at realistic
levels of annuitization, the risk of living beyond one's expected lifespan has
huge eects on saving.
4.5 Insurance
The life cycle model just described implies very strong demand for insurance
products, particularly annuities and Long-Term-Care (LTC) insurance. If
priced fairly, these products insure against lifespan or medical expense risk
much more eciently than standard assets. For example, using a very sim-
ple version of the life cycle model with only life span uncertainty, Yaari [99]
shows that people should immediately annuitize all their wealth. However, it
is well-documented that U.S. households hold small amounts of annuities and
LTC insurance; see Fang [30] for a recent survey. In this section, we point out
that although the low purchase rate of insurance products presents a challenge
to the simplest versions of the life cycle model, more realistic versions of the
model have the potential to better explain both low insurance holdings and
savings behavior.
Many studies of the underannuitization puzzle focus on adverse selection:
long-lived people are more likely to purchase annuities, driving annuity prices
up and pricing out those who do not expect to live so long. Mitchell et al. [78]
show that when they use the mortality tables of those who actually purchase
annuities at age 65, annuities pay back 93 cents in expected present discounted
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value for every dollar purchased. When they instead use the mortality tables
for the overall population, the return falls to 81 cents. Comparing the returns
of the annuitant and overall populations signals the cost of selection. But
even at observed levels of adverse selection, most reasonably calibrated life
cycle models with only life span risk still imply that people should completely
annuitize. For example, Lockwood [69] shows that people are willing to pay
up to 25% of their wealth to gain access to completely fair annuity markets
and 16% to access annuity markets with a 10% load.
A number of papers have studied potential reasons for the lack of annu-
itization. Medical spending risk could increase demand for liquid assets and
thus reduce the demand for annuities. Davido et al. [17] and Peijnenburg et
al. [87] show that high medical risk early in retirement tends to decrease an-
nuity demand, while large medical risks late in retirement tends to increase it.
Because medical spending tends to be modest before age 70 and grows rapidly
with age (De Nardi et al. [24], Robinson [90]), medical spending is unlikely
to signicantly decrease the demand for annuities. Medical spending may in
fact even increase the demand for annuities, as the mortality credit provided
by annuities makes them the most eective way to save for large medical ex-
penditures at very old ages (Pang and Warshawsky, 2010). Pashchenko [85]
and Lockwood [69], who study the demand for annuities in a rich framework
that includes medical expense risk, stress the importance of bequest motives
in reducing annuity demand.
In contrast to annuities, which pay benets as long as the individual re-
mains alive, LTC insurance pays o only when the individual needs expensive
long-term care services. In principle, the demand for LTC insurance should be
28
large, since this insurance often pays o when other nancial resources have
been exhausted and medical needs are high.
However, access to comprehensive LTC insurance is likely incomplete. Hen-
dren [46] shows that, conditional on observables, the market for an insurance
product will collapse if private information problems are suciently large. His
main nding is that a large fraction of those applying for are rejected by the
underwriters because of private information problems. Hendren estimates that
23% of 65-year-olds have health conditions that preclude them from purchas-
ing LTCI. Fang [30] points out that the typical LTC insurance contract caps
both the maximum number of days covered over the life of the policy and the
maximum daily payment for a nursing home stay, a daily payment that is often
xed in nominal terms.
Moreover, Brown and Finkelstein [13] point out that, by serving as the
payor of last resort, Medicaid signicantly reduces the return to purchasing
LTC insurance for 75% of the U.S. single households. This is because Medicaid
generally assists households only with LTC expenses not covered by other forms
of insurance. Lockwood [68] nds that bequest motives also reduce the demand
for LTC insurance. Davido [16] shows that home equity may substitute for
long term care insurance. Indeed, it has been shown that health shocks and
loss of a spouse are associated with housing wealth decumulation (Venti and
Wise [96] and Poterba et al. [89]). This point reinforces a larger theme: assets
serve many purposes and can be used for many contingencies.
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5 Bequest motives
As we discussed in section 2.6, many people die with positive assets and thus
leave bequests to their children or other heirs. However, it is not clear whether
these bequests are intentional or unintentional. For example, De Nardi et
al. [24] estimate their model with and without a bequest motive. Figure 10
compares the distributions of bequests implied by both versions of the model
against the data. The two specications t the data almost equally well. It
turns out that in absence of a bequest motive, modest changes in utility func-
tion parameters yield larger precautionary savings motives, allowing the model
to t the wealth data almost equally well. Nonetheless, the estimated bequest
motive is strong, especially for the rich. This shows the diculty of sepa-
rately identifying precautionary savings motives from bequest motives using
wealth data alone. Both motivations encourage saving and both motivations
are strongest for the rich|bequests are modeled as luxury goods by construc-
tion and precautionary savings motives are strongest for rich people who rely
less heavily on means-tested government insurance. As Dynan et al. [27] note,
many people are likely driven by both motivations.
More recent papers have attempted to attempt to distinguish between pre-
cautionary savings and bequest motives by matching additional features of the
data. For example, Lockwood [68] matches additional data on purchases of
LTC insurance. His key idea is that in the absence of bequest motives all
savings is due to precautionary purposes, which implies that demand for LTC
insurance is very large. In the absence of insurance market frictions, the only
way to simultaneously match savings and low purchases of LTC insurance is to
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Figure 10: Cumulative distribution function of assets held 1 period before
death: data (solid line) and model (lighter line). Panels a and b show results
for models with and without bequest motives, respectively.
have modest precautionary savings motives and a signicant bequest motive.
Using a complementary argument, Inkmann and Michaelides [55] conclude
that the life insurance holdings of UK households are consistent with bequest
motives.
Ameriks et al. [5] and Ameriks et al. [4] match the responses to `Strate-
gic Survey Questions' that involve hypothetical trade-os between consuming
long term care and leaving bequests. The hypothetical wealth splits chosen
by survey respondents help identify the relative strength of bequest motives.
Their results, based on samples of wealthy retirees, suggest that precautionary
motives are at least as important as bequest motives. De Nardi et al. [26]
match Medicaid recipiency rates and transfer amounts. Matching the Medi-
caid data bounds the medical expense risk and the strength of the associated
precautionary saving motives generated by their model. To match observed
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assets holdings in this environment, the model attributes part of savings to
bequest motives. More generally, papers that bring more aspects of the data
to bear tend to nd more evidence in favor of a bequest motive, at least for
richer families.
There is also uncertainty about how bequest motives are best modeled.
Altonji et al. [3] empirically reject important implications of the purely altru-
istic, dynastic model. Hurd [51] and Kopczuck and Lupton [60] nd that the
presence or absence of children is not important to determining either the ex-
istence or the strength of bequest motives. In contrast, Ameriks et al. [5] nd
that households with children answer `Strategic Survey Questions' in a way
consistent with stronger bequest motives. Laitner and Juster [64] nd large
heterogeneity both in bequest motives and strength.
An alternative to altruism is the strategic bequest motive introduced by
Bernheim et al. [10], where potential bequests are used as rewards. Brown [14]
nds that among AHEAD respondents and aged 69 and older, 14% (including
spouses) receive regular care from their children, while only 1% pay a child
for informal care. However, Brown [14] nds that while caregivers receive
more end-of-life transfers, the transfers are modest. Furthermore, McGarry
and Schoeni [76] show that in the AHEAD data, nancial transfers from living
parents to their children do not favor caregivers.
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6 Housing, portfolio choice, and rate of return
risk
6.1 Housing
Our model contains a single risk free asset which can be bought or sold without
cost and which aects the consumer only as a nancial resource. However, the
most important asset for most US households is their primary home, which
provides consumption services as well as nancial returns.
In most countries, people run down their non-housing wealth more quickly
than their housing wealth (Nakajima and Telyukova [81], Blundell et al. [11]).
For example, Blundell et al. [11] show that between 2002 and 2012 the median
non-housing wealth of elderly US households declined by close to 50% (Fig-
ure 11, panel a, circle-dash line), whereas median housing wealth declined by
about 30% (Figure 11, panel b, circle-dash line). During the same period in
England, the elderly ran down their non-housing wealth by 25% (Figure 11,
panel a, solid line), but increased their housing wealth by 40% (panel b).
Changes in housing wealth are driven by life-cycle changes in homeowner-
ship and home size, and time-specic changes in house prices. In the US, the
homeownership rate falls from 80% to 60% between ages 70 and 90, a fact that
cannot be explained by cohort eects or dierential mortality. In England,
Blundell et al. [11] show that the homeowership rate falls from 75% to 60%
between ages 70 and 90. Regarding downsizing, Banks et al. [9] show that
many retired Americans sell their home and use the proceeds to purchase a
smaller home, although this is much less common in England. Finally, during
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Figure 11: Median net non-primary housing wealth (panel a) and net primary
housing wealth (panel b) in the US and England by age and cohort, 2002-2012.
Notes : Sample consists of households where at least 1 member responds in
both the rst and last waves.
the period 2002-12, the sample period behind Figure 11, both countries expe-
rienced run ups and run downs in housing prices. By 2012, US housing prices
had returned to their 2002 values, while prices in England had risen 20%.
There are several potential reasons why the elderly may liquidate their
nancial wealth before their housing wealth (e.g., Engen et al. [29]). First,
liquidating a house entails substantial transaction costs. For example, most
buyers and sellers use real estate agents and these agents typically charge 5-6%
of the selling price of the house. This is in addition to taxes and other fees
associated with selling a house and the time and eort spent moving. Using a
quantitative structural model, Yang [100] shows that observed housing trans-
action costs can explain why older US households decrease their consumption
of housing more slowly than their consumption of other goods and services.
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Second, housing is typically tax-advantaged relative to other assets, in sev-
eral ways. For example, in the US housing can often be bequeathed to one's
heirs tax-free, whereas liquidating the housing wealth will often force the seller
to pay capital gains taxes. Furthermore, housing assets are often exempt from
the asset tests associated with the Medicaid and Supplemental Security Income
programs (De Nardi et al. [25]). Households that sell their home and use the
proceeds to purchase nancial assets become ineligible for these government
transfers until the nancial assets are depleted. Finally, income from nancial
assets is usually taxable. The `rent' a homeowner pays herself is untaxed.
Third, people may enjoy prefer living in owner-occupied housing to living
in rental properties, perhaps because they can more easily modify their own
property to t their needs. Estimating a structural model of saving and housing
decisions, Nakajima and Telyukova [80] nd that homeowners dissave slowly
because they prefer to stay in their homes as long as possible.
Documenting that homeowners decumulate their wealth more slowly, Naka-
jima and Telyukova [80] argue that homeownership is an important driver of
retiree saving. In principle older homeowners should be able to access their
housing wealth without moving, through the use of reverse mortgages. Naka-
jima and Telyukova [82] report that in 2011 only 2.1% of eligible homeowners
had reverse mortgage loans. They nd that bequest motives, nursing-home-
move risk, house price risk, and loan costs all contribute to the low take-up of
reverse mortgages, but do not completely explain it. It is not clear whether the
observed slow decumulation of housing wealth can be explained unless reverse
mortgages are assumed to be unavailable.
The results in De Nardi et al. [24] suggest that appropriately modeling med-
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ical expenses is important to appropriately modeling slow wealth decumulation
in old age, even when running down one's assets is costless and frictionless.
Looking across countries, Nakajima and Telyukova [81] argue that medical ex-
penses have important eects, but primarily on non-housing assets. Because
home equity can substitute for LTC insurance (Davido [16]) and can be be-
queathed, the home ownership motivation cannot be measured independently
of the other savings motives.
6.2 Portfolio choice, and rate of return risks
Surprisingly little work has been done in terms of the link between health,
medical expenses, and portfolio choices. Yogo [101] allows for portfolio choice
in addition to health investment. Koijen et al. [58] propose a framework for
summarizing the risk exposure of complex portfolios in presence of mortality
and medical expense risks. These models are rich but do not account for the
fact that people cannot borrow against future annuitized income, for example.
Gomes and Michaelides [41] develop a rich model of portfolio choice where peo-
ple face borrowing constraints and earnings risks but not health and medical
expense risks later in life.
French et al. [35] document large dierences in portfolio holdings across the
elderly population and present information on the rates of return of dierent
asset types. These asset price shocks are an important source of risk to the
elderly population. However, Love and Smith [71] show that there is little
evidence of a link between these portfolio shares and health status, once other
factors (such as the level of wealth) are taken into account.
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Arguably the most important return shocks facing most households are
changes in house prices. Li and Yao [67] use a quantitative general equilib-
rium model to study the lifecycle eects of house price changes. They point out
that increases in home prices likely reect increases in expected future rents
and thus higher expected future expenses. This eect mutes the non-housing
consumption and saving responses to house price changes. Older homeowners
face a shorter horizon, however; they will likely have to pay higher rents for
only a limited period of time. Thus the non-housing consumption response of
old homeowners is more sensitive to house price changes than that of middle-
aged homeowners. Attanasio et al. [6] use a structural model with housing
transaction costs and home-owning utility to study the eects of house price
shocks on consumption growth in the aggregate. They nd that their model
matches the data quite well. Whether these models generate empirically plau-
sible asset trajectories in old age remains an open question.
7 Couples
Building on Hurd [51], Hurd [52] was among the rst to develop a model of
the savings of couples. Moving from singles to couples introduces several new
considerations. Even if one assumes that couples behave as a unit, rather than
strategically,4 couples are subject to a dierent set of risks and, potentially,
4Mazzocco [74] shows that under full commitment, the behavior of a couple can be char-
acterized by a unique utility function if the husband and wife share identical discount factors,
identical beliefs and Harmonic Absolute Risk Aversion utility functions with identical cur-
vature parameters.
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bequest motives. Couples face two sets of health and medical expense risks,
but they can pool both their risks and their assets. They may also be able to
partially self-insure by using the time of the healthier partner to provide care
for the other one. On the other hand, two-person households are exposed to
the risk of having one person die. Couples may thus want to leave bequests
not only to children, but also to surviving partners. While single households
likely have lower needs, Braun et al. [12] show that the death of the husband
often leads to a large reduction in the wife's income: widows are much more
likely to be impoverished than wives. Moreover, altruism toward a surviving
spouse may dier greatly from altruism toward other potential heirs.
Figure 12: Median assets for intact couples, PI percentiles computed using
couples only.
Figure 12 displays median assets for households who are couples during our
entire sample period. The rst thing to notice is that these couples are richer
than singles. The younger couples in the highest PI quintile for couples hold
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over $300,000, compared to $200,000 (in 2005 dollars) for singles, and even the
couples in the lowest PI quintile hold over $60,000 in the earlier years of their
retirement, compared to zero for the singles. As for the singles, the couples
in the highest PI quintile hold on to large amount of assets well into their
nineties, while those in the lowest income PIs display more asset decumulation.
Interestingly, these graphs display at to increasing asset proles, going from
low to high permanent income.
Poterba et al. [89] and French et al. [36] document large falls in assets
at the death of a spouse. To quantify this observation, we perform xed
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Figure 13: Net Worth, conditional on permanent income and family structure.
Notes : Figure assumes all households begin as couples, then potentially change
to a single male or single female at age 80, then exit at age 90.
eects regression analysis, where wealth is regressed on a polynomial in age,
age interacted with permanent income and household composition (i.e., single
male, single female, couple). Figure 13 reports the predicted assets of a couple
39
starting out, respectively, in the top PI income quintile and in the bottom one,
and display the assets under three scenarios. Under the rst one, the couple
remains intact until age 90. Under the second one, the male dies at age 80,
while under the third one, the female dies at age 80. For both PI levels, assets
stay roughly constant if both partners are alive. In contrast, assets for the
top-PI couples display a signicant drop if either spouse dies. Interestingly, at
the lower PI quintile assets experience a large drop when the male dies, but
much less of a drop when the female dies rst.
8 Medical expenses, government insurance, and
policy reform
In the previous sections we have identied medical expenses as an important
factor generating large savings in old age and government insurance as an im-
portant factor mitigating this risk and thus reducing savings. Kopecky and
Koreshkova [61] develop a general equilibrium model with uncertain lifetimes
and old age medical expense risk. They show that savings for out-of-pocket
medical expenses in old age account for a signicant fraction, 13.5%, of aggre-
gate wealth.
In a period of large and ever increasing pressure on budget decits, the
question of how and to what extent the government should insure medical ex-
penses risk becomes even more pressing. De Nardi et al. [25] estimate a rich
structural model of endogenous medical expenses and savings and nd that
most individuals value the insurance provided by Medicaid at more than their
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actuarial cost. Braun et al. [12] nd that, in presence of medical expenses and
lifespan risk, the gains from means-tested social insurance such as Medicaid
and food stamps are large. In fact, increasing size of the insurance by a third
benets both the poor and the auent, assuming the increase is nanced by a
payroll tax. Pashchenko and Porapakkarm [86] study the eects of Obamacare
(and increasing Medicaid provision) in a general equilibrium model with ex-
ogenous medical expenses and nd that the welfare gains stemming from the
reform mostly come from redistribution, rather than reductions in adverse se-
lection. Jeske and Kitao [56] also study the nancing of health insurance and
medical spending in a general equilibrium framework.
Thus, the literature to date suggests that means-tested programs such as
Medicaid are welfare enhancing. However, in presence of population aging
programs that benet the elderly, such as Medicaid and Medicare, will become
more broad-based and expensive. For example, Attanasio et al. [8] study the
nancing of Medicare in presence of population aging and medical expense risk.
They nd that the labor income tax will have to increase from 23% in 2005 to
36% in 2080, with over two thirds of the tax increase due to Medicare. This
result helps understand the size and growing importance of Medicare costs in
presence of population aging and the scal adjustments that will be needed to
nance it.
How medical spending should be distributed across people is also an im-
portant question. Ales et al. [2] assume that health care increases the survival
probability and consider an environment where individuals have dierent life
cycle proles of productivity. In the socially ecient allocation for their en-
vironment, health care spending increases with labor productivity during the
41
working years, but is equal for everyone after retirement5. They nd that in
the U.S., those in the top of the income distribution should spend 1.5 times
what those at the bottom spend on health care, conditional on health status,
for most of the life cycle. This ratio should decline from about 2 (at age 25) to
1 at retirement. According to their analysis, the largest ineciencies lie in the
lower part of the income distribution and in post retirement ages, a nding
that is consistent with the idea that health insurance programs targeted to the
elderly poor after retirement are welfare enhancing (Braun et al. [12]).
Some, although not all, of the aforementioned papers allow for a bequest
motive. In the aggregate, the importance of bequests has been recognized at
least since the debate between Kotliko and Summers [63] and Modigliani [79]
about what fraction of wealth that is transmitted across generations rather
than earned during one's lifetime. Gale and Scholz [39] suggest that the
amount is at least 50%. De Nardi [20] nds that bequests play an impor-
tant role in explaining the observed distribution of wealth.
As we have pointed out above, the relative importance of bequest and pre-
cautionary savings motives has not been resolved. Moreover, how the bequest
motive is modeled remains an important and open question. However, it is
likely that the consequences of dierent policies depend critically on how these
two motives are modeled and quantied. For example, Fuster et al. [38] nd
that the welfare gains of privatizing Social Security are increasing in the degree
of altruism.
5Interestingly, Ozkan [83] nds that early in life the rich spend signicantly more on
health care, whereas starting from middle age, the medical spending of the poor dramatically
exceeds that of the rich.
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9 Conclusion
As we have shown, the elderly run down their savings much more slowly than
implied by a basic life cycle model with a known date of death. The literature
suggests that uncertainty and heterogeneity in the length of life and medical
spending, along with bequest motives, are important to understanding the
slow decumulation of retirement wealth. In contrast, public insurance may
reduce the need to save to insure against longevity and medical spending risk,
although it is a realistic feature of the economies that we study.
Some of the risks aecting savings can be estimated directly from the data.
For instance, we can measure total medical expenditures, private insurance
premia and benets, and government transfers to gauge the degree of total
and out-of-pocket medical spending risk. Also, we can estimate longevity risk
and its heterogeneity both from observed outcomes and from self-reported
expectations. Thus, we have good measures of the kind of medical expense
and longevity risks that people face. However, the relative importance of
the bequest and precautionary saving motives depend crucially on preference
parameters that cannot be identied directly. More specically, we need to
infer risk aversion, patience, the strength of the bequest motive, and the extent
to which bequests are a luxury good.
Identifying these parameters, for both singles and couples, and the relative
importance of the bequest and precautionary saving motives that they imply
is important, because the consequences of policy reforms hinges on the relative
strength of these saving motives. Looking at additional features of the data,
especially those not matched in the calibration or estimation of the model, is
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a key assessment tool. Recent studies have brought additional information to
bear in promising ways.
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